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TOWARD A CLARITY OF THE EXTREME VALUE
THEOREM
KARIN U. KATZ, MIKHAIL G. KATZ, AND TARAS KUDRYK
Abstract. We apply a framework developed by C. S. Peirce to
analyze the concept of clarity, so as to examine a pair of rival
mathematical approaches to a typical result in analysis. Namely,
we compare an intuitionist and an infinitesimal approaches to the
extreme value theorem. We argue that a given pre-mathematical
phenomenon may have several aspects that are not necessarily
captured by a single formalisation, pointing to a complementar-
ity rather than a rivalry of the approaches.
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1. Introduction
German physicist G. Lichtenberg (1742 - 1799) was born less than a
decade after the publication of the cleric George Berkeley’s tract The
Analyst, and would have certainly been influenced by it or at least
aware of it. Lichtenberg wrote:
The great artifice of regarding small deviations from the
truth as being the truth itself [which the differential cal-
culus is built upon]1 is at the same time the foundation
of wit, where the whole thing would often collapse if we
were to regard these deviations in the spirit of philo-
sophic rigour (Lichtenberg 1765-1770 [62, Notebook A,
1, p. 21]).
The “truth” Lichtenberg is referring to is that one cannot have
(dx 6= 0) ∧ (dx = 0),
namely infinitesimal errors are strictly speaking not allowed and, philo-
sophically speaking, equality must be true equality and only true equal-
ity. The allegation Lichtenberg is reporting as fact is Berkeley’s con-
tention that infinitesimal calculus is based on a logical iconsistency.
The “deviation from the truth” refers to the so-called infinitesimal er-
ror that allegedly makes calculus possible.
1.1. A historical re-appraisal. Recently the underlying assumption
of Lichtenberg’s claim, namely the inconsistency of the historical in-
finitesimal calculus, has been challenged. On Leibniz, see Knobloch
(2002 [52]), (2011 [53]); Katz & Sherry (2013 [46]); Guillaume (2014
[35]). The present text continues the re-appraisal of the history and
philosophy of mathematical analysis undertaken in a number of recent
texts. On Galileo, see Bascelli (2014 [3]). On Fermat, see Katz, Schaps
& Shnider (2013 [44]) and Knobloch (2014 [54]). On Euler, see Reeder
(2012 [70]) and Bair et al. (2013 [1]), (2014 [2]). On Cauchy, see Borovik
& Katz (2012 [16]) and others. Part of such re-appraisal concerns the
place of Robinson’s infinitesimals in the history of analysis.
1We have reinstated (in brackets) Lichtenberg’s comment concerning the differ-
ential calculus, which was inexplicably deleted by Penguin’s translator R. J. Holling-
dale. The German original reads as follows: “Der große Kunstgriff kleine Abwe-
ichungen von der Wahrheit fu¨r die Wahrheit selbst zu halten, worauf die ganze
Differential Rechnung gebaut ist, ist auch zugleich der Grund unsrer witzigen
Gedanken, wo offt das Ganze hinfallen wu¨rde, wenn wir die Abweichungen in einer
philosophischen Strenge nehmen wu¨rden.”
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We will examine two approaches to the extreme value theorem, the
intuitionistic (i.e., relying on intuitionistic logic) and the hyperreal,
from the point of view of Peirce’s three grades of clarity (Peirce [69]).
It is sometimes thought that Robinson’s treatment of infinitesimals
(see [71]) entails excursions into advanced mathematical logic that may
appear as baroque complications of familiar mathematical ideas. To
a large extent, such baroque complications are unnecessary. The 1948
ultrapower construction of the hyper-real fields by E. Hewitt [40], com-
bined with J.  Los´’s theorem [65] from 1955 (whose consequence is the
transfer principle), provide a framework where a large slice of analysis
can be treated, in the context of an infinitesimal-enriched continuum.
Such a viewpoint was elaborated by Hatcher [37] in an algebraic con-
text and by Lindstrøm [64] in an analytic context (see Section 10).
We seek to challenge the received wisdom that a modern infinitesimal
approach is necessarily baroque.
Laugwitz authored perceptive historical analyses of the work of Eu-
ler and Cauchy (see e.g., [60]), but was somewhat saddled with the
numerous variants of the Ω-calculus that he developed jointly with
Schmieden (1958 [77]). As a result, he did not fully stress the sim-
plicity of the ultrapower approach. Synthetic Differential Geometry
(following Lawvere), featuring nilsquare infinitesimals, is based on a
category-theoretic framework; see Kock [22] and J. Bell [6], [7].
1.2. Practice and ontology. To steer clear of presentism in interpret-
ing classical infinitesimalists like Leibniz and Euler, a crucial distinction
to keep in mind is that between syntax/procedures, on the one hand,
and semantics/ontology, on the other; see Benacerraf (1965 [8]) for the
dichotomy of practice vs ontology. Euler’s inferential moves involving
infinitesimals and infinite numbers find good proxies in the procedures
of Robinson’s framework. Meanwhile, the kind of set-theoretic or type-
theoretic ontology necessary to make Robinson’s framework acceptable
to a modern rigorous mind is certainly nowhere to be found in the clas-
sical infinitesimalists, any more than Cantorian sets or Weierstrassian
epsilontics.
What we argue is not that Robinson is the necessary logical conclu-
sion of Leibniz. Rather, we have argued, with Felix Klein, that there is
a parallel B-track for the development of analysis that is often under-
estimated in traditional A-track epsilontist historiography. The point
is not that the B-track leads to Robinson, but rather than B-track is
distinct from A-track; in fact, a number of modern infinitesimal theo-
ries could potentially fit the bill (for more details on the two tracks see
Section 8).
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The ultrapower construction is related to the classical construction
of the reals starting from the set QN of sequences of rationals, in the
following sense. In the classical construction, one works with the subset
of QN consisting of Cauchy sequences. Meanwhile, in the ultrapower
construction one works with all sequences (see Section 8). The re-
searchers working in Robinson’s framework have often emphasized the
need to learn model theory truly to understand infinitesimals. There
may be some truth in this, but the point may have been overstated.
A null sequence (i.e., sequence tending to zero) generates an infinites-
imal, just as it did in Cauchy’s Cours d’Analyse (Cauchy 1821 [21]).
The link between Cauchy’s infinitesimals and those in the ultrapower
construction was explored by Sad, Teixeira & Baldino [76] and Borovik
& Katz [16].
In the sequel whenever we use the adjective intuitionistic, we re-
fer to mathematical frameworks relying on intuitionistic logic (rather
than any specific system of Intuitionism such as Brouwer’s). Our in-
tuitionistic framework is not BISH but rather that of Troelstra and
van Dalen [87]. In a typical system relying on intuitionistic logic, one
finds counterexamples that seem “paradoxical” from the classical view-
point, such as Brouwerian counterexamples. Such examples are present
in Bishop’s framework as well, though the traditional presentations
thereof by Bridges and others tend to downplay this (see a more de-
tailed discussion in Section 5). Feferman noted that
[Bishop] finesses the whole issue of how one arrives at
Brouwer’s theorem [to the effect that every function on
a closed interval is uniformly continuous] by saying that
those are the only functions, at least initially, that one
is going to talk about (Feferman 2000 [28]).
One of the themes of this text is the idea that, inspite of the incompat-
ibility between the two frameworks for EVT, important insight about
the problem can be gained from both. Our approach is both comple-
mentary and orthogonal to that of Wattenberg (1988 [88]).
2. Grades of clarity according to Peirce
Is there anything unclear about the extreme value theorem (EVT)?
Or rather, as an intuitionist might put it, is there anything clear about
the classical formulation of the EVT?
The clarity referred to in our title alludes to the Peircean analysis of
the 3 grades (stages) of clarity in the emergence of a new concept. The
framework was proposed by C. S. Peirce in 1897, in the context of his
analysis of the concept of continuity and continuum, which, as he felt
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at the time, is composed of infinitesimal parts (see [38, p. 103]). Peirce
identified three stages in creating a novel concept:
there are three grades of clearness in our apprehensions
of the meanings of words. The first consists in the con-
nexion of the word with familiar experience . . . The sec-
ond grade consists in the abstract definition, depending
upon an analysis of just what it is that makes the word
applicable . . . The third grade of clearness consists in
such a representation of the idea that fruitful reasoning
can be made to turn upon it, and that it can be applied
to the resolution of difficult practical problems (Peirce
1897 [69] cited by Havenel 2008 [38, p. 87]).
The “three grades” can therefore be summarized as follows:
(1) familiarity through experience;
(2) abstract definition with an eye to future applications;
(3) fruitful reasoning “made to turn” upon it, with applications.
The classical EVT asserts that a continuous function on a compact
interval has a maximum. Attaining clarity in the matter of the EVT
is therefore contingent upon
• clarity in the matter of continuity ; and
• clarity in the matter of maximum.
We will analyze these issues in Section 3.
3. Perceptual continuity
Freudenthal [29] wrote that Cauchy invented our notion of continuity.
Yet 60 years earlier, Abraham Gotthelf Kaestner (1719–1800) had the
following to say in this matter:2
In a sequence3 of quantities the increase or the decrease
takes place in accordance with the law of continuity (lege
continui), if after each term of the sequence, the one that
follows or preceeds the given term, differs from it by as
little as one wishes, in such a way that the difference
of two consecutive terms may be less than any given
quantity (Kaestner 1760 [42, paragraph 322, p. 180]).
Similar formulations can be found even earlier in Leibniz. Kaestner’s
formulation of continuity is free of both infinitesimal language and ǫ, δ
2Translation kindly provided by D. Spalt.
3We have replaced the term series found in Kaestner, by the term sequence, to
conform with modern usage.
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terminology, yet it is a concise expression of a perceptual idea of con-
tinuity, at stage 1 of the Peircean ladder. Kaestner’s definition is far
from being a mathematically coherent one. Bolzano and Cauchy retain
priority even after this Kaestner is discovered. But what is interest-
ing about his definition is its local nature. Contrary to popular belief,
Bolzano and Cauchy were not the first to envision a local definition of
continuity.
Decades later, Cauchy expressed perceptual continuity even more
succinctly, in terms of a function varying by imperceptible degrees un-
der minute changes of the independent variable (see, e.g., his letter to
Coriolis of 1837 cited by Bottazzini [17, p. 107]).
At the perceptual level, the EVT seeks to capture the intuitively
appealing idea of aiming for the “highest peak on the graph”.
Bolzano and Cauchy were the first ones to sense a need to pro-
vide proof of assertions such as the intermediate value theorem (IVT).
Bolzano similarly proved the EVT in 1817 but his manuscript was only
rediscovered in the 1860s. What kind of proof Cauchy (1789–1857)
might have provided for the EVT we will never know. The EVT is
usually attributed to Weierstrass who proved it in a course during 1861
(see [33, p. 18] and [33, p. 25, note 8]).
The presence of potentially infinitely many points in the domain of
the function signals an immediate difficulty, residing in the possibility
of the graph rising higher and higher without bound.
One begins to perceive the complexity of the task with the realisation
of an inherent instability of an elusive “highest point” on the graph.
Namely, the values at a pair of far-away points may be so close together
as to make the choice difficult. A minute perturbation of the function
may have an appreciable effect upon the answer. We summarize the
two difficulties signaled so far:
• problem of existence of supremum over infinite domain;
• inherent instability of solution due to discontinuous dependence
on data.
A perceptual approach to looking for a solution would be to subdi-
vide the domain by means of a partition
{xi} (3.1)
so fine as to challenge the resolution of even the most powerful phys-
ical microscope. The number of partition points being finite, there is
necessarily one,
xi0 ,
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with the highest value of the function among the partition points. Con-
tinuing the perceptual analysis, one now “zooms in” on the atom (or
quark, or string)
c
carrying the partition point xi0 . Since, by hypothesis, the function
varies by imperceptible degrees, it does not deviate away from the
value f(x0) appreciably, on c.
Of course, if the point is in a visible picture as seen by the human
eye, what looks like the maximum point may be one of several whose
height is visibly the same, but one does not know which of these, at a
higher magnification, will be the actual maximum. Thus, one may be
zooming in on the wrong place. Nonetheless, in the perceptual stage
being discussed here, one is only looking for what is visibly a maximum.
Perceptually speaking, one will never know it’s the wrong place.
It is this phenomenon that makes it difficult to give a perceptual
proof that can be turned into a mathematical proof of the EVT. If
one draws the curve, one may be able to see the maximum, but a
mechanical process of computing where the maximum is, that works
without the human eye, is more subtle, perhaps even impossible.
How is such a perceptual proof transformed into a mathematical
argument of a higher Peircean grade of clarity?
4. Constructive clarity
A constructive presentation of the EVT may be found in the text by
Troelstra and van Dalen [87, p. 294-295]. A majority of the wider math-
ematical public is not intimately familiar with this approach. Therefore
we will recall the main points in some detail. When a step in a con-
structive argument is identical with the classical one, we will preface it
by an editorial clause “as usual”.
The starting point is a challenge to the non-constructive nature of
“existence” proofs in classical mathematics. Such proofs generally go
under the name of proof by contradiction. The main ingredient in a
proof by contradiction is the law of excluded middle (LEM).
To provide an elementary example, consider the proof of irrationality
of the square root of 2, as discussed by E. Bishop [12, p. 18]. Construc-
tively speaking, being irrational is a stronger property that simply
being not rational. Namely, irrationality involves an explicit lower
bound for the distance from any rational (in terms of its denomina-
tor). Thus, for each rational m/n, the integer 2n2 is divisible by an
odd power of 2, while m2 is divisible by an even power of 2. Hence we
have |2n2 − m2| ≥ 1. Here we have applied LEM (or more precisely
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the law of trichotomy) to an effectively decidable predicate over Z.
Since the decimal expansion of
√
2 starts with 1.41 . . ., we may as-
sume m
n
≤ 1.5. It follows that
|
√
2− m
n
| = |2n
2 −m2|
n2
(√
2 + m
n
) ≥ 1
n2
(√
2 + m
n
) ≥ 1
3n2
,
yielding a numerically meaningful proof of irrationality which avoids
the use of LEM in its classical form (see Section 5 for a more advanced
discussion). This is, of course, a special case of Liouville’s theorem on
diophantine approximation of algebraic numbers; see [36].
The intuitionist/constructivist challenge to classical mathematics has
traditionally targeted the logical principle expressed by LEM. An addi-
tional point to keep in mind is a parallel change in the interpretation of
the existential quantifier ∃, which now takes on a constructive meaning.
Thus, to show that
∃x : P (x),
one needs to specify an effective procedure for exhibiting such an x.
We say that x is the supremum of a set X ⊂ R if and only if the
following condition is satisfied:
(∀y ∈ X) (y ≤ x) ∧ (∀k ∈ N) (∃y ∈ X) (y > x− 2−k) .
As usual, the supremum of a function f on [a, b] is the sup of the
set {f(x) : x ∈ [a, b]}. A set X ⊂ R is totally bounded if for each k ∈ N,
there is a finite collection of points x0, . . . , xn−1 ∈ X such that
(∀x ∈ X) (∃i < n) (|x− xi| < 2−k
)
.
Lemma 4.1. A totally bounded set X ⊂ R has a supremum.
Proof. The proof exploits a constructive version of the notion of a
Cauchy sequence. Namely, one requires |xk − xk+n| < 2−k for ev-
ery n ∈ N (here n is independent of k). For each k we specify a corre-
sponding finite collection of points xk,0, . . . , xk,n−1 ∈ X (with n = n(k))
such that (∀x ∈ X) (∃i < n(k)) (|x− xk,i| < 2−k
)
. Next, let
xk := max{xk,i : i < n(k)}.
It follows that
(∀x ∈ X) (∀k) (x− xk < 2−k
)
, (4.1)
and we apply formula (4.1) to complete the proof.4 
4In more detail, formula (4.1) applied to x = xk+1 implies xk+1 − xk < 2−k.
Applying the same formula with k + 1 in place of k to x = xk implies xk − xk+1 <
2−k−1. Hence |xk − xk+1| < 2−k. Summing a geometric series we obtain |xk −
xk+n| < 2−k + 2−k−1 + . . . + 2−k−n−1 < 2−k+1. The sequence 〈xn : n ∈ N〉 is
therefore Cauchy. One easily shows that its limit equals supX .
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Compared with the classical version of the EVT, the constructive
version requires a stronger hypothesis of uniform continuity,5 and yields
a weaker result, namely the existence of sup(f) but not the existence
of a maximum. Of course, the advantage of the constructive version is
a clarification of the nature of constructively provable results, and may
be considered more “honest”.
Theorem 4.2 (Constructive EVT). Let f : [0, 1] → R be uniformly
continuous. Then sup(f) exists.
Proof. Let α be a modulus for f , so that one has
(∀x, y ∈ [0, 1]) (∀k) (|x− y| < 2−αk =⇒ |f(x)− f(y)| < 2−k) .
Then the set {f(x) : x ∈ [0, 1]} is totally bounded. Indeed, let n >
2αk. Let xi :=
i
n
for i < n. Then by uniform continuity, we obtain
that (∀x ∈ [0, 1]) (∃i < n) (|f(x)− f(xi)| < 2−k
)
, and therefore the
set of values is totally bounded. The proof is completed by applying
Lemma 4.1. 
The constructive impossibility of strengthening the conclusion of the
theorem is discussed in Section 5.
5. Counterexample to the existence of a maximum
The conclusion of Theorem 4.2 cannot be strengthened to the exis-
tence of a maximum, in the sense of the constructive formula
(∃x ∈ [0, 1]) (f(x) = sup(f)) .
Indeed, let a be any real such that a ≤ 0 or a ≥ 0 is unknown. Next, de-
fine f on [0, 1] by setting f(x) = ax. Then sup(f) is simply max(0, a),
but the point where it is attained cannot be captured constructively
(see [87, p. 295]). To elaborate on the foundational status of this ex-
ample, note that the law of excluded middle:
P ∨ ¬P
(“either P or (not P )”), is the strongest principle rejected by con-
structivists. A weaker principle is the LPO (limited principle of om-
niscience). The LPO is the main target of Bishop’s criticism in [13].
The LPO is formulated in terms of sequences, as the principle that it
is possible to search “a sequence of integers to see whether they all
vanish” [13, p. 511]. The LPO is equivalent to the law of trichotomy:
(a < 0) ∨ (a = 0) ∨ (a > 0).
5Pointwise continuity and uniform continuity on a compact interval are equiva-
lent with respect to classical logic, but not with respect to intuitionistic logic.
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An even weaker principle is (a ≤ 0) ∨ (a ≥ 0). The existence of a
satisfying the negation
¬ ((a ≤ 0) ∨ (a ≥ 0))
is exploited in the construction of the counterexample under discus-
sion. The principle (a ≤ 0) ∨ (a ≥ 0) is false intuitionistically. After
discussing real numbers x ≥ 0 such that it is “not” true that x > 0
or x = 0, Bishop writes:
In much the same way we can construct a real number x
such that it is not true that x ≥ 0 or x ≤ 0 (Bishop 1967
[11, p. 26]), (Bishop & Bridges 1985 [14, p. 28]).
The fact that an a satisfying ¬((a ≤ 0) ∨ (a ≥ 0)) yields a coun-
terexample f(x) = ax to the extreme value theorem (EVT) on [0, 1] is
alluded to by Bishop in [11, p. 59, exercise 9]; [14, p. 62, exercise 11].
Bridges interprets Bishop’s italicized “not” as referring to a Brouwe-
rian counterexample, and asserts that trichotomy as well as the princi-
ple (a ≤ 0)∨ (a ≥ 0) are independent of Bishopian constructivism. See
Bridges [19] for details; a useful summary may be found in Taylor [86].
6. Reuniting the antipodes
The advantage of the constructive framework is the anchoring of the
distinction between what can be exhibited and what cannot, in the
very mathematical formalism. Rather than being an afterthought that
may or may not trickle down to the students, the distinction is built
into the intuitionistic hardware. Meanwhile, the level of detail required
to operate such machinery risks masking the simple perceptual insights
at the level of the cognitive underpinnings of the EVT.
Viewed as a companion to the classical approach, the intuitionistic
framework can usefully enhance constructive issues that are otherwise
relegated to footnotes, appendices, or optional material in textbooks.
Meanwhile, viewed as an alternative to the classical approach, the in-
tuitionistic framework risks masking important conceptual phenomena
available in classical idealisations, particularly in areas such as geome-
try and mathematical physics. Minimal surfaces, geodesics, variational
principles, etc., are inextricably tied in with ever more sophisticated
implementations of the classical EVT, and rely upon the existence of
the actual extremal points rather than merely suprema. Thus, the
existence of the Calabi-Yau manifolds, ubiquitous in both differential
geometry and mathematical physics, is nonconstructive; see Yau &
Nadis [89].
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More specifically, general relativity routinely exploits versions of the
extreme value theorem, in the form of the existence of solutions to
variational principles, such as geodesics, be it spacelike, timelike, or
lightlike. At a deeper level, S.P. Novikov [67, 68] wrote about Hilbert’s
meaningful contribution to relativity theory, in the form of discover-
ing a Lagrangian for Einstein’s equation for spacetime. Hilbert’s deep
insight was to show that general relativity, too, can be written in La-
grangian form, which is a satisfying conceptual insight.
A radical constructivist’s reaction would be to dismiss the material
discussed in the previous paragraphs as relying on LEM (needed for the
EVT), hence lacking numerical meaning, and therefore meaningless. In
short, radical constructivism (as opposed to the liberal variety) adopts
a theory of meaning amounting to an ostrich effect as far as certain
significant scientific insights are concerned. A quarter century ago,
M. Beeson already acknowledged constructivism’s problem with the
calculus of variations in the following terms:
Calculus of variations is a vast and important field which
lies right on the frontier between constructive and non-
constructive mathematics (Beeson 1985 [5, p. 22]).
An even more striking example is the Hawking-Penrose singularity the-
orem explored by Hellman [39], which relies on fixed point theorems
and therefore is also constructively unacceptable, at least in its present
form. However, the singularity theorem does provide important sci-
entific insight. Roughly speaking, one of the versions of the theorem
asserts that certain natural conditions on curvature (that are arguably
satisfied experimentally in the visible universe) force the existence of a
singularity when the solution is continued backward in time, resulting
in a kind of a theoretical justification of the Big Bang. Such an insight
cannot be described as “meaningless” by any reasonable standard of
meaning preceding nominalist commitments; see (Katz & Katz 2012
[43]) for more details.
7. Kronecker and constructivism
Kronecker subdivided mathematics into three fields: analysis, alge-
bra, and number theory (or arithmetic). In his 1861 inaugural speech
at the Academy of Science of Berlin, Kronecker said:
The study of complex multiplication of elliptic functions
leading to works the object of which can be character-
ized as being drawn from analysis, motivated by algebra
and driven by number theory (see Gauthier [30, p. 39]).
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In his 1886 letter to Lipschitz, he declared that with the publication of
his 1882 work Grundzu¨ge einer arithmetischen Theorie der algebrais-
chen Gro¨ssen, he has found the long-sought foundations of his theory
of forms with the arithmetisation of algebra which had been the goal
of his mathematical life.
In his 1891 lectures [59], Kronecker criticized Bolzano for having
used the crudest means (mit den rohesten Mitteln) in his proof of the
intermediate value theorem; see Gauthier (2009 [31, p. 225]), (2013 [32,
p. 39]); Boniface & Schappacher [15, p. 269-270]).
Thus, Kronecker did not consider geometry and mathematical physics
as part of mathematics. Of the three fields of analysis, geometry, and
mathematical physics (see Boniface & Schappacher [15, p. 211]), he ar-
gued in favor of a constructive arithmetisation of analysis alone.6 This
was to be a reformulation of analysis in terms of the natural numbers
rather than the speculative constructs such as R, as envisioned by his
contemporaries Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass. Kronecker plainly
acknowledged that two-thirds of what is today considered mathematics
(namely, what he referred to as geometry and physics) is not amenable
to such arithmetisation.7 Radical constructivists attempting to enlist
Kronecker to their cause of constructivizing all of modern mathemat-
ics may therefore be “more vigorous than accurate”, to quote Robinson
(1968 [72]).
As a transition to the remainder of this text, we note that classical
mathematics can be thought of as an extension of constructive math-
ematics, inasmuch as the former uses more and stronger axioms than
the latter, although the verificationist interpretation of the existence
quantifier necessarily leads to a clash with the classical viewpoint (see
end of Section 5 for details). Meanwhile, analysis over the hyperreals
can be done in the framework of the standard Zermelo-Fraenkel axiom
system with the axiom of choice. The key consequence of the latter is
the existence of ultrafilters proved by Tarski [85] in 1930 (the use of
ultrafilters is explained in Subsection 8.4).
An admirable attempt to bridge the gap between “the constructive
and nonstandard views of the continuum” resulted in a volume of pub-
lications [78], but not immediately in a unity of purpose. A type of
proof described as “constructive modulo an ultrafilter” proposed by
6The meaning of the term “arithmetisation” has changed since Kronecker in-
troduced it, and today refers to the traditional set-theoretic foundations of R in
particular and analysis in general.
7H. Edwards, a contemporary expert on Kronecker’s thinking, has done much
to restore balance in the popular perception of Kronecker (see e.g., [25]), but may
have overlooked the three-fold partition and its ramifications for constructivisation.
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Ross [73], [74] represents an interesting attempt at a dialogue. Our
theme here is that, even though the two conceptual frameworks may
not be compatible, both can yield useful mathematical insight.
An intriguing proposal for bridging the gap specifically in the con-
text of the extreme value theorem was recently made by Schuster [80].
Here one exploits the principle of unique choice, alternatively called
the principle of non-choice. The heuristic idea is that, if uniqueness
is sufficiently ubiquitous (e.g., “if a continuous function on a complete
metric space has approximate roots and, in a uniform manner, at most
one root”), then existence follows, as well (“it actually has a root”)
(see also [79]). There is a vast literature on the related uniqueness
paradigm. Thus, in Kohlenbach [55], the uniform notion of uniqueness
was introduced under the name “modulus of (uniform) uniqueness”
(see also his book [56]). Some of these ideas were anticipated in a 1979
text by Kreinovich [57] (see also his review [58]). The theorem that if a
computable function in C[0, 1] attains its maximum at a unique point
then that point is computable, was already proved by Grzegorczyk [34]
in 1955. Further work includes Ishihara [41]; Berger and Ishihara [9];
Berger, Bridges, and Schuster [10]; Diener and Loeb [24]; Schwichten-
berg [81]; Bridges [20]; and others.
8. Infinitesimal clarity
Approximation issues stressed in the constructive approach are im-
portant for both mathematics and its applications. Similarly, it is
important for the student to realize that the tangent line is the limit of
secant lines, which gives geometric motivation for the idea of derivative.
8.1. Nominalistic reconstructions. At the same time, it is impor-
tant to realize that the Weierstrassian (ǫ, δ) approach tends to remove
motion and geometry from the definition of basic concepts of the cal-
culus. The game of “you tell me the epsilon, I will tell you the delta”
superficially resembles approximation theory. However, the crucial is-
sue is the functional dependence of δ on ǫ, rather than any specific ap-
proximation; no wonder engineering students, who are certainly vitally
concerned with approximation, are seldom taught the (ǫ, δ) method. In
reality dressing students to perform multiple-quantifier epsilontic logi-
cal stunts on pretense of teaching them infinitesimal calculus is merely
a way of dressing up a bug to look like a feature (to borrow a quip
from computer science folklore), as is apparent if one compares this
approach to the lucidity of its infinitesimal counterpart.
The Weierstrassian (ǫ, δ) approach was necessitated by an inability to
justify the ontological material that naturally arose in scientific inquiry
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during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, namely the infinitesimals,
which were present at the conception of the theory by Leibniz, Johann
Bernoulli, and others. For more details, see Bair et al. [1]; Bottazzi et
al. [4]; Mormann et al. [66].
Starting in the 1870s, Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass justified
the logical complications they introduced into the foundations, in terms
of their success in eliminating foundational material they were unable
to justify. Cantor went as far as calling infinitesimals the “cholera
bacillus of mathematics”, and published a paper purporting to “prove”
that they are self-contradictory; see Ehrlich (2006 [27]) for more details.
Their work amounted to a nominalistic reconstruction of analysis, by
eliminating ontological material they could not account for; see Katz &
Katz (2012 [43]) for more details. The success of their reconstruction
resulted in a widespread ad-hoc ontological commitment to an exclusive
reality of the real numbers (or their constructive analogues).
Such a reductive philosophical commitment has taken a toll on the
development of mathematics. Thus, Cauchy’s Dirac delta function and
its applications in Fourier analysis were forgotten for over a century,
because of the reductive ideology that eliminated infinitesimals, with-
out which Cauchy’s applications of what would later be called the Dirac
delta function could not be sustained; see Laugwitz (1989 [60]); Katz &
Tall (2013 [47]). Similarly, Cauchy was the one who invented our notion
of continuity, and he defined it in terms of infinitesimals. To Cauchy,
an infinitesimal was generated by a null sequence. This is related both
perceptually and formally to the construction of infinitesimals in the
ultrapower approach (see [76]).
An infinitesimal-enriched continuum offers a possibility of mimick-
ing more closely the perceptual analysis of the EVT, in constructing a
formal proof, due to the availability of a hierarchical number system,
with an Archimedean continuum (A-continuum for short) englobed in-
side an infinitesimal-enriched Bernoullian continuum (B-continuum for
short).
8.2. Klein on rivalry of continua. Felix Klein described a rivalry of
such continua in the following terms. Having outlined the developments
in real analysis associated with Weierstrass and his followers, Klein
pointed out that
The scientific mathematics of today is built upon the
series of developments which we have been outlining.
But an essentially different conception of infinitesimal
calculus has been running parallel with this [conception]
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

B-continuum
A-continuum
Figure 1. Taking standard part
through the centuries (Klein [51, p. 214]) [emphasis added–
authors].
Such a different conception, according to Klein,
harks back to old metaphysical speculations concerning
the structure of the continuum according to which this
was made up of [...] infinitely small parts [51, p. 214]
[emphasis added—authors].
Victor J. Katz (2014 [48]) appears to imply that a B-track approach
based on notions of infinitesimals or indivisibles is limited to “the work
of Fermat, Newton, Leibniz and many others in the 17th and 18th
centuries”. This does not appear to be Klein’s view. Klein formulated
a condition, in terms of the mean value theorem, for what would qualify
as a successful theory of infinitesimals, and concluded:
I will not say that progress in this direction is impossible,
but it is true that none of the investigators have achieved
anything positive (Klein 1908 [51, p. 219]).
Klein was referring to the current work on infinitesimal-enriched sys-
tems by Levi-Civita, Bettazzi, Stolz, and others. In Klein’s mind,
the infinitesimal track was very much a current research topic; see
Ehlrich (2006 [27]) for a detailed coverage of the work on infinitesimals
around 1900.
8.3. Formalizing Leibniz. Leibniz’s approach to the differential quo-
tient8
dy
dx
(today called the derivative) was formalized by Robinson. Here one
exploits a map called the standard part, denoted “st”, from the finite
part of a B-continuum, to the A-continuum, as illustrated in Figure 1.
In the context of the hyperreal extension of the real numbers, the
map st “rounds off” each finite hyperreal x to the nearest real x0 =
st(x) ∈ R. In other words, the map “st” collapses the cluster of points
8See (Sherry 1987 [82]) and (Katz & Sherry 2012 [46], [45]).
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infinitely close to a real number x0, back to x0. Note that both the
term “hyper-real field”, and an ultrafilter construction thereof, are due
to E. Hewitt in 1948 (see [40, p. 74]). The transfer principle allowing
one to extend every first-order real statement to the hyperreals, is due
to J.  Los´ in 1955 (see [65]). Thus, the Hewitt- Los´ framework allows
one to work in a B-continuum satisfying the transfer principle. See
(Keisler 1994 [50]) for a historical outline.
We will denote such a B-continuum by the new symbol IIR. We will
also denote its finite (limited) part by
IIR<∞.
The map “st” sends each finite point x ∈ IIR, to the real point st(x) ∈ R
infinitely close to x:
IIR<∞
st


R
We illustrate the construction by means of an infinite-resolution micro-
scope in Figure 2.
Robinson defined the derivative as st
(
∆y
∆x
)
, instead of ∆y/∆x. For
an accessible exposition (see H. J. Keisler [49, 50]).
8.4. Ultrapower. To elaborate on the ultrapower construction of the
hyperreals, let QN denote the space of sequences of rational numbers.
Let
(
QN
)
C
denote the subspace consisting of Cauchy sequences. The
reals are by definition the quotient field R :=
(
QN
)
C
/Fnull, where Fnull
contains all null sequences. Meanwhile, the hyperreals can be obtained
by forming the quotient IIR = RN
/Fu, where a sequence 〈un〉 is in Fu
if and only if the set {n ∈ N : un = 0} is a member of a fixed ultra-
filter. To give an example, the sequence
〈
(−1)n
n
: n ∈ N
〉
represents a
nonzero infinitesimal, whose sign depends on whether or not the set 2N
is a member of the ultrafilter. A helpful “semicolon” notation for pre-
senting an extended decimal expansion of a hyperreal was described by
Lightstone [63].
9. Hyperreal extreme value theorem
We now return to the EVT. The classical proof of the EVT usually
proceeds in two or more stages. Typically, one first shows that the
function is bounded. Then one proceeds to construct an extremum by
one or another procedure involving choices of sequences. The hyperreal
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4r
Figure 2. The standard part function, st, “rounds off” a
finite hyperreal to the nearest real number. The function
st is here represented by a vertical projection. An “infini-
tesimal microscope” is used to zoom in on an infinitesimal
neighborhood of a standard real number r, where α, β,
and γ represent typical infinitesimals. Courtesy of
Wikipedia.
approach is both more economical (there is no need to prove bounded-
ness first) and less technical. To show that a continuous function f(x)
on [0, 1] has a maximum, let
H
be an infinite hypernatural number (for instance, the one represented
by the sequence 〈1, 2, 3, . . .〉 with respect to the ultrapower construc-
tion outlined in Subsection 8.4). The real interval [0, 1] has a natural
hyperreal extension. Consider its partition into H subintervals of equal
infinitesimal length 1
H
, with partition points xi =
i
H
as i “runs” from 0
to H . The existence of such a partition follows by the transfer principle
(see more below) applied to the first order formula
(∀n ∈ N) (∀x ∈ [0, 1]) (∃i < n) ( i
n
≤ x < i+1
n
)
.
The function f is naturally extended to the hyperreals between 0 and 1.
Note that in the real setting (when the number of partition points is
finite), a point with the maximal value of f can always be chosen
among the partition points xi, by induction. We have the following
first order property expressing the existence of a maximum of f over a
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finite collection:
(∀n ∈ N) (∃i0 < n) (∀i < n)
(
f( i0
n
) ≥ f( i
n
)
)
.
We now apply the transfer principle to obtain
(∀H ∈ IIIN) (∃i0 < H) (∀i < H)
(
f( i0
H
) ≥ f( i
H
)
)
, (9.1)
where IIIN is the collection of hypernatural numbers. Formula (9.1) is
true in particular for a particular infinite hypernatural H ∈ IIIN \ N.
Thus, there is a hypernatural i0 such that 0 ≤ i0 ≤ H and
f(xi0) ≥ f(xi) (9.2)
for all i = 0, . . . , H . Consider the real point c = st(xi0) where “st” is
the standard part function. By continuity of f , we have f(xi0) ≈ f(c),
and therefore
st(f(xi0)) = f(st(xi0)) = f(c).
An arbitrary real point x lies in a suitable sub-interval of the partition,
namely x ∈ [xi, xi+1], so that st(xi) = x. Applying “st” to inequal-
ity (9.2), we obtain
st(f(xi0)) ≥ st(f(xi)).
Hence f(c) ≥ f(x), for all real x, proving c to be a maximum of f . Note
that the argument follows closely our perceptual analysis in Section 3.
10. Approaches and invitations
Robinson’s approach in (Robinson 1966 [71]) was formulated in the
framework of model theory of mathematical logic.
Two decades later, Lindstrøm (1988 [64]) presented an alternative
analytical approach in his text An invitation to nonstandard analysis,
described as follows:
I have tried to make the subject look the way it would
had it been developed by analysts or topologists and not
logicians. This is the explanation for certain unusual
features such as my insistence on working with ultra-
power models and my willingness to downplay the im-
portance of first order languages (Lindstrom [64, p. 1]).
In this approach, the proof of EVT, though essentially the same, is
even more elementary and short, because one does not need to use the
transfer principle.
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11. Conclusion
The strength of the constructive approach is the ability to place
into sharp relief a hard-nosed analysis of what can be effectively ex-
hibited, and what cannot. The strength of the infinitesimal approach
is its closer fit with the perceptual analysis of the phenomenon at the
heart of the EVT. The complementarity of the resulting insights ul-
timately points to a companionship, rather than a rivalry, between
the two approaches. Such fruitful complementarity persists inspite of
possible formal incompatibilities of the intuitionistic and the classical
frameworks.
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